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Elective Share Statutes: The Right to Elect Against
Property Subject to a General Power of
Appointment in the Decedent
Margaret M. Mahoney*
I. Introduction
Elective share statutes, enacted in most common law jurisdictions, protect
the financial interests of the surviving spouse by creating a right to a forced
share of the decedent's estate. In effectuating the protective purpose, the states
must determine what property is reachable by the spouse. It is the thesis of this
article that all property subject to a general power of appointment in the dece-
dent at the time of death should be includable in the elective estate.
Traditionally, the doctrine of relation back has defined the relationship of
the donee of a power to the appointive property as a nonproprietary agency
relationship. As applied by the courts to spousal claims, relation back has had
the effect of disallowing an elective share in appointive assets. An historical
analysis of the doctrine indicates that it was not a logical development in the
evolution of our system of property law. A reevaluation of the nature of a
general power easily leads to the conclusion that the donee is more than an
agent, and has an authority with regard to the property that is distinctly pro-
prietary. Indeed, in other contexts, like the areas of taxation and creditors'
rights, the courts and legislatures have set aside the doctrine of relation back
when confronted with policy reasons for treating appointive assets like the
property of the donee.
The protective policy of the election statutes is clear, and outweighs any
interest in the continued application of relation back in the forced share con-
text. Property subject to a general power at death should be treated like owned
property for the purpose of determining the size of the elective share. This
result could be reached in many jurisdictions without statutory reform.
II. The Elective Share Statutes
Freedom of testation is an important and protected right in our system of
private property ownership.' It is not, however, absolute. The states impose
restrictions upon the right to dispose of one's property freely at death in order
to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance. Various means of pro-
viding the desired financial protection have been employed. In an age when
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1 "[A] summary of views of philosophers and experts" on the subject of freedom of testation appears
in L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 4-5 (1955).
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realty was the major form of wealth, the institutions of dower and curtesy per-
formed the function by creating in the survivor an interest in the real property
owned by the decedent during the marriage. 2 More recently, the community
property system and elective share legislation have become the major tools 3 for
guaranteeing the economic independence of the surviving spouse. In the eight
community property states, 4 the protection is built into the system of property
ownership, since each spouse is the owner of one half of the marital assets. 5
Among the forty-two common law property states and the District of Colum-
bia, all but five jurisdictions have elective share statutes.
6
Various policy considerations, centering around the state interest in mar-
riage and families, and the state power to regulate the economic relationships
among family members, justify the restriction imposed upon freedom of testa-
tion by elective share legislation. 7 The obligation imposed upon the decedent's
estate by the statute can be viewed as an extension of the duty imposed inter
vivos upon the decedent to support the spouse, thereby maintaining the
economic independence of the family and relieving the state of a potential duty
to support. Forced share legislation involves a limited recognition of marriage
as an economic partnership. Disinheritance of the spouse is deemed an unfair
2 See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §5 5.5, 5.60 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952 & Supp. 1977).
3 Other protections for the surviving family, often available in conjunction with those mentioned in the
text, are homestead rights, see, e.g., id. §5 5.75-. 120; the family allowance, see, e.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF WILLS 128-34 (2d ed. 1953); and mortmain statutes, see, e.g., id. at 135-38.
The doctrines of testamentary fraud, undue influence, and mental capacity, in their application to
cases where testators disinherit natural objects of bounty, have the effect of protecting surviving family
members, by invalidating the will.
4 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
5 See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 7.1.
6 The five common law property jurisdictions that have no forced share legislation are Georgia, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Carolina provide a statutory dower right. N.J. STAT. ANN.
3A:35-1 (West 1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-4-1 (1969); S.C. CODE § 21-5-110 (1976).
In 1974 South Dakota enacted elective share legislation as part of the South Dakota Uniform Probate
Code. 1974 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 196, § 2-201. The effective date of the Code, however, was postponed to
January 1, 1976. 1975 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 189. The South Dakota Uniform Probate Code was subsequent-
ly repealed, as of July 1, 1976. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 29A (1977).
The other thirty-seven common law property states and the District of Columbia have enacted elective
share statutes. ALA. CODE tit. 43, § 43-1-15 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.070 (1972) (effective 1973); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 60-501 (1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-201 (1973 and Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-273a (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE § 19-113 (1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 732.201 (West 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-201 (1976 and Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 29-1-3-1 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.236
(West 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-603 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.080 (Baldwin 1978); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1056 (West 1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-203 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 191, 5 15 (West 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.282 (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.212 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25 (Supp. 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.160 (Supp. 1978);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-2-201 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §
30-2313 (1975); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967 and Supp. 1978-1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 2107.39 (Page
1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 44 (West 1970); OR. REV. STAT. 5 114.105 (1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2202-2203 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-601 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN.
575-2-201 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S 402 (1974); VA. CODE § 64.1-13 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.05 (West 1971 and Supp. 1979-1980); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-101 (1977).
7 See W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 24-25 (1960); Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable
Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 681 (1966); Note, The Protection of the Surviving
Spouse Against Disinheritance: A Search for Georgia Reform, 9 GA. L. REV. 946, 958 (1975).
For a view that the need for protection is not as compelling today as it might once have been, see Clark,
The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory
Reforms, 2 COHN. L. REV. 513, 544-45 (1970).
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and unacceptable testamentary disposition in light of the importance of the
marital relationship in the societal structure. 8
Elective share statutes generally give the surviving spouse the option of ac-
cepting the provisions of the decedent's will in favor of the spouse, or taking in-
stead a forced share of the decedent's real and personal estate. Within this
basic pattern there are many variations.9 For example, the method of deter-
mining the size of the elective share may be by reference to the state's intestacy
statute0 or through use of a formula which is often a fixed percentage of the
estate and set by statute."t
Whatever the variations among statutes, the size of the elective share will
depend upon the size of decedent's estate. Thus, "estate" for this purpose
must be defined in terms of includable property. The statutes, however, are
generally silent regarding such a definition.1 2 Clearly, the elective estate in-
cludes property owned by the decedent at death and subject to probate. Beyond
the probate estate, what property should be subject to the spouse's election?
Most attempts to bring nonprobate assets into the elective estate have involved
property that the decedent owned and conveyed inter vivos although retaining
certain incidents of ownership.1 3 In cases where the retained interest and con-
trol following the transfer have been great, the courts have concluded that the
transfer was illusory and the decedent was properly treated as the owner of the
property at death, for the purpose of allowing the spouse's claim.' 4 A similar
analysis of the proprietary interest of the decedent in property subject to a
general power at death would result in allowance of spousal claims against such
appointive property.
III. Includabiity of Appointive Property in the
Elective Estate: The Case Law
Assets subject to a power of appointment at death are generally not in-
8 The elective share approach to providing protection for the surviving spouse has not been free of
criticism. The inflexibility of the system has led to proposals for reform involving a consideration of the facts
of each case (such as the actual need of the survivor) and some judicial discretion in the final determination
of the share. SeeW. MAcDONALD, supra note 7, at 44-46, 271-73; Cahn, Restraints onDisinheritance, 85 U. PA.
L. Ray. 139, 147-49 (1936); Plager, supra note 7, at 714-15.
The failure of existing legislation to recognize the problem of inter vivos transfers in derogation of the
elective share at death has also stimulated criticism. See, e.g., W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 271-73;
Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 Gao. L.J. 499, 503-06 (1964).
9 See, W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 21-24.
10 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 59-603 (1976).
11 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.201 (West 1976).
The percentage of the estate may be less if the spouse is not decedent's first spouse and there are
children of a prior marriage. E.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-3-1 (1976).
12 For a discussion of the language of the statutes and the extent to which they limit the definition of
"estate" for this purpose, see text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
13 An in-depth discussion of the case law in this area appears in W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at
67-270.
14 E.g., in Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), the court allowed the spouse to reach
assets conveyed by the decedent into trust just before death, on the ground that,
decedent... retained not only the income for life and power to revoke the trust, but also the right
to control the trustees ....
Judged by the substance, not by the form, the testator's conveyance is illusory, intended only
as a mask for the effective retention by the settlor of the property which in form he had conveyed.
Id. at 380-81, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
Elective share statutes in a number ofjurisdictions expressly include within the elective estate property
transferred by the decedent inter vivos, if certain incidents of ownership have been retained. E.g., UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (section amended 1975).
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cludable in the probate estate of the donee, unless the donee exercises the
power in favor of the estate. Such assets, like property subject to illusory
transfers, are nonprobate assets that surviving spouses have sought to include
in the decedent's elective estate for purposes of determining the size of the
forced share. The attempts to include appointive assets have been uniformly
unsuccessful.
A power of appointment is "a power created or reserved by a person (the
donor) having property subject to his disposition enabling the donee of the
power to designate, within such limits as the donor may prescribe, the
transferees of the property or the shares in which it shall be received." 15 By vir-
tue of the device of the power, one important incident of ownership, the right to
dispose of property, can be separated out from the bundle of rights that con-
stitute full ownership and given to the donee. In order to understand the nature
of the power of appointment, it must be determined whether, by virtue of hav-
ing this incident of ownership regarding certain assets, the donee has a proper-
ty interest in them, with attendant rights and responsibilities. The surviving
spouse, who proceeds under a statute that provides generally for a share of the
decedent's property, can reach appointive assets only if the donee-decedent has
such a proprietary interest.
In analyzing the proprietary nature of the power of appointment, the
distinction must be made between general powers and special powers. A
general power of appointment is one which "being exercisable before the death
of the donee, . . . can be exercised wholly in favor of the donee, or, being
testamentary, . . . can be exercised wholly in favor of the estate of the
donee." 16 A special power, on the other hand, by definition, is one that cannot
be exercised in favor of the donee or the donee's estate.17 It is generally as-
sumed that a special power does not constitute an ownership interest in proper-
ty. 8 There will be no attempt here to discuss the rights of the surviving spouse
in property over which decedent held a nongeneral power of appointment.
Historically, the question of the nature of the donee's interest in ap-
pointive property has been answered by the doctrine of relation back. The doc-
trine addresses the manner in which title to property passes at the time of ap-
pointment, and declares that the appointee becomes the successor in interest to
the donor, by the act of the donor in creating the power. The act of appoint-
ment is viewed as an event causing title to shift from the donor to the appointee
and not as a juristic act. A corollary to the notion that the act of appointment
relates back to the creation of the power is the view that the .power itself is not
an interest in the property that it affects, and that the donee is a mere agent
with regard to the property. 19
In determining the spouse's interest in appointive assets, the automatic
application of the doctrine of relation back by the courts has resulted in a rule
disallowing such claims. 20 In Kates's Estate,21 for example, the decedent hus-
15 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 318(1) (1940).
16 Id. § 320(1).
17 Id. 5 320(2).
18 See, e.g., id. § 326, Comment a.
19 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 911-913 (2d ed. 1956).
20 W. MACDONALD, supra note 7, at 253; 2 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 947.
21 282 Pa. 417, 128 A. 97 (1925).
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band was the life beneficiary of, and donee of a general testamentary power of
appointment over, one half of the residuary estate of his father. He exercised
the power in a general blending clause, which provided for distribution of the
combined owned and appointive assets, after payment of debts and expenses,
to his widow and other legatees. The widow elected to take her statutory share
(one third of the estate), and argued that she was entitled to one third of both
the owned and appointive assets. The court limited her claim under the statute
to one third of the owned property of the decedent because, inter alia, 22 to hold
otherwise would produce the following unacceptable result:
[T]he widow will receive much more from the estate of the father than her hus-
band directed she should have under the power of appointment vested in him.
The effect of this is to defeat pro tanto the will of the father, . . . . The ap-
pointed estate was the father's; his dominion over it was supreme; any attempt
"to appropriate [such] a gift to a purpose or person not intended, would be an
evasion of the donor's private dominion" and hence must necessarily fail. 23
The court's assumption, that the donor of appointive property retains supreme
dominion over it, is a statement of the doctrine of relation back. If the father
has complete dominion, it follows that the donee has no property interest; and
those claiming through the donee can assert no interest.
24
In Ci y Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Green, 25 the terms of the inter vivos trust
created by the decedent husband provided for payment of a fixed income to his
ex-wife until her death or remarriage; payment of the excess income to the set-
tlor during this period; and a retained testamentary power to appoint the re-
mainder. The settlor subsequently remarried. His will exercised the power in a
general blending clause; gave the appointive assets, combined with his owned
assets, to his sisters in equal shares, and expressly excluded the second wife.
She elected to take a statutory share against the will and sought to include the
appointive assets in the estate of her husband for purposes of determining the
amount of this share. In denying her claim to the appointive assets the court
stated:
The law is settled that the persons named in the execution of a power of ap-
pointment take under the authority of the instrument by which the power was
created and with the same effect as if such persons had been named in such in-
22 See text accompanying note 81 infta for other bases of the court's decision in Kates's Estate.
The exercise of a general power by means of a blending clause, as was undertaken by the donee in
Kates's Estate, has been held in other contexts to be an indication of donee's intent to be treated as owner of
the appointive assets. For example, the doctrine of capture applies in situations where the donee's exercise,
although ineffective, manifests an intent to remove the property from the estate of the donor for all purposes
and not just for the purpose of the intended appointment. The use of a blending clause is commonly regard-
ed as evidence of the necessary intent to capture the property for the donee's estate. E.g., 2 L. SiM s & A.
SMITH, supra note 19, 5 974, at 433-34. In the creditors' rights and state inheritance tax areas, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has viewed a general blending clause as a gift of the fund to donor's own estate.
Anderson Estate, 373 Pa. 294, 95 A.2d 674 (1953) (creditors' rights) (dictum); Twitchell's Estate, 284 Pa.
135, 130 A. 324 (1925) (inheritance tax). If the same court had similarly treated the blending clause in
Kates's Estate, the spouse might have succeeded in his claim.
23 282 Pa. at 420, 128 A. at 97-98 (citations omitted).
24 In Myers' Trust, 35 Pa. D. & C. 492 (1939), the Pennsylvania Orphan's Court stated in dictum that
Kates's Estate is "authority for the principle that a widow electing to take against a will which exercises a
power of appointment takes no part of the appointed estate." Id. at 498.
25 160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y.S. 473 (1936).
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strument. [Decedent] in exercising the power of appointment in his will was a
mere conduit. Such exercise of the power gives no testamentary character to
the disposition of the trust fund at issue, as it is not the property of the dece-
dent. The source of title of the appointees of the power, the defendant sisters,
is the trust agreement which raised the power and not the will of decedent.
26
The idea that the terms of the exercise should be "read back" into the instru-
ment of the donor creating the power is a formulation of the doctrine of relation
back which arose relatively late in the history of the doctrine. 27 As applied in
Green it simply reinforces the conclusion that the donee lacks any legal interest
in the appointive property when the concept of relation back is used to analyze
the nature of the power of appointment.
In In re Burchell's Trust,2 8 the court held that the surviving husband could
not reach assets, appointed by the decedent wife to others under a general
testamentary power, because "such power does not constitute 'estate' pos-
sessed by the donee within [the elective share statute].' '29 The court cited as
authority for this conclusion another New York case, In re Rogers' Will. 0 In
Rogers' Will, the court held that property appointed under a general power at
death "does not constitute [part ofi an estate possessed by the donee of the
power within the provisions of the Decedent Estate Law. 31 This holding was
premised upon the court's belief that "[t]he exercise of such a power by a
donee does not relate to an estate vesting in the donee. The donor merely
utilizes the donee as an instrument for the devolution of the title of his, the
donor's, property." ' 32 Since the court accepted relation back as a threshold
premise, the assets could not logically be treated as property of the donee for
the purpose of determining the size of the elective share.
In Harlan National Bank v. Brown, 3 the surviving husband sought an elec-
tive share in property over which the decedent wife had a general testamentary
power of appointment which she exercised in favor of her estate. The court
decided the issue against the husband in a summary fashion.
34
In the situation where the appointment is in favor of donee's estate, as in
Harlan National Bank, application of relation back does not end the inquiry into
the nature of the donee's interest in the property at death. The assets may be
properly treated like the property of the donee, not because donee held a
general power, but rather, because the assets are part of the probate estate. 3
The probate estate generally is subject to the statutory claim of the surviving
spouse.
26 Id. at 377, 289 N.Y.S. at 481.
27 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 912. While the basic doctrine was "clearly recognized long
before the Statute of Uses," id. at 371, the reading back variation first appeared in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury.
28 278 App. Div. 450, 105 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1951).
29 Id. at 455, 105 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
30 250 App. Div. 26, 293 N.Y.S. 626 (1937).
31 Id. at 30, 293 N.Y.S. at 632.
32 Id.
33 317 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1958).
34 Id. at 905.
35 See W. MAcDONALD, supra note 7, at 253; Zack, Administrative Aspects of Powers of Appointment, 98
TRUSTS & EsTs. 1090, 1091 (1959). Contra, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY S 332(2), Comment b (1940) (on the
theory that the election statutes generally require renunciation of the provisions of the will, and the spouse
should not be allowed to take advantage of the testamentary exercise).
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Finally, in City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller,36 the decedent wife had
created an inter vivos trust which reserved a life estate and general testamentary
power of appointment in herself and named as takers in default of appointment
her distributees under the state law of intestacy. Decedent's will exercised the
power in favor of persons other than the husband, who elected to take his
statutory share of the estate. In determining whether his claim could reach the
trust corpus as well as decedent's general estate, the court cited Kates's Estate
37
for the proposition that "property subject to a power in the deceased spouse to
appoint by will is not part of the estate of such spouse and the surviving spouse
electing to take in derogation of the will receives no part of such property.' '38
Moreover, the court held that "[n]o distinction.., is to be drawn because here
the power was reserved in an inter vivos trust set up by the testatrix herself.
The exercise of the power is read into, and becomes part of, the trust instru-
ment. "39 Like the courts that had earlier considered the issue, the Miller court
accepted and applied the doctrine of relation back without question, thus
foreclosing the claim of the electing spouse.
IV. A Critical Analysis of the Doctrine
of Relation Back
The judicial rule that the electing spouse is not entitled to a share of dece-
dent's appointive assets is based upon the doctrine of relation back. 40 A critical
analysis of the doctrine, of the nature of the general power of appointment, and
of the policies expressed in elective share legislation, leads to the conclusion
that application of relation back in this context is unnecessary and inap-
propriate.
The doctrine of relation back had its origins early in the development of
the power of appointment. 41 The power arose, along with the equitable fiction
of the use, as a device for overcoming legal disabilities regarding the devisabili-
ty of property. 42 Prior to the Statute of Uses, 43 the Chancellor enforced an ar-
rangement whereby 0, the owner of Blackacre, at that time legally incapable of
devising the property, conveyed the fee "to X, to the use of such persons as 0
might designate by will, and until and in default of such appointment, to the
use of 0." After the conveyance, X owned the legal fee simple absolute, and 0
owned the equitable fee, subject to divestment by the exercise of O's general
36 163 Misc. 459, 297 N.Y.S. 88, aff'dmem., 253 App. Div. 707, 1 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1937), motionfor leave
to appeal granted, 253 App. Div. 880, 2 N.Y.S.2d 798, re'd on other grounds, 278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553
(1938).
37 282 Pa. 417, 128 A. 97 (1925).
38 163 Misc. at 464, 297 N.Y.S. at 94.
39 Id.
The widower in Miller ultimately succeeded in obtaining an elective share of the trust corpus. The
Court of Appeals of New York determined that the interests retained by the wife in the property were a life
estate and reversion; no power of appointment had been created. The reversionary interest was includable
in the estate at death and subject to the spouse's claim. 278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553.
40 See text accompanying notes 15-39 supra.
41 See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.3; 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note
19, 5 912; Berger, The General Power of Appointment as an Interest in Property, 40 NEB. L. REv. 104, 107-10
(1960).
42 See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.2; 2 L. SIMES &A. SMITH, supra note
19, § 872.
43 27 Hen. VIII, c.10 (1536).
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testamentary power. In the event that 0 exercised the power, the equitable in-
terest (use) would shift to O's appointee. After the enactment of the Statute of
Uses, the power of appointment was recognized also in the courts of law; and
one could appoint legal as well as equitable interests. The Statute of Uses pro-
vided that legal title must follow the equitable use. Thus, O's conveyance
created a legal fee simple in 0, subject to divestment by O's exercise of the
power. Upon exercise, legal title (seisin) would shift from 0 to O's appointee.
In explaining the manner in which title passed at the time of exercise, an
analogy was drawn to the manner in which title passed when a fee simple
followed by an executory interest was divested by the occurrence of the event
upon which the future interest was conditioned. 44 For example, if 0 conveyed
Blackacre "to X in fee, but if X dies without issue, to Y," the estates created
by the conveyance after the Statute of Uses were a fee simple in X and an ex-
ecutory interest in Y. If, in fact, X died without issue, then X's fee would be
divested by that event; the future interest in Y would become a possessory
present interest. Seisin shifted from X to Y upon the happening of the pre-
scribed event. When 0 conveyed Blackacre "to A in fee simple, with a general
power in 0 to appoint to others," then the interest in A, like the interest in X,
was a fee subject to divestment. Although the two fees were analogous estates,
it does not necessarily follow that the two occurrences capable of divesting them
were similarly analogous.
The death of X without issue and the exercise of the power by 0 were two
occurrences different in nature and in effect. The former involved no voluntary
act on the part of anyone; the latter was a discretionary act by 0. In the first
hypothetical, the death of X without issue resulted in the vesting of a con-
tingent executory interest in Y, created by 0 at the time of the initial con-
veyance. In the second hypothetical, no future interest was created by O's con-
veyance. The interest of the potential appointees (objects) of a general power of
appointment was not considered to be an interest, executory or otherwise, in
the property; 45 but rather was regarded as a mere expectancy. The exercise of
the power thus caused the title to pass to appointees who took an interest in the
property for the first time by virtue of the exercise. The act created a property in-
terest.
In the development of the law of powers, however, these differences were
ignored. The exercise of a power was viewed, like the death of X without issue,
as a mere event that caused title to shift, and not as a legal act. The discretion
44 1 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 33.
The executory interest and this type of shifting of legal title were allowable only after the Statute of
Uses. Prior to that time, however, the "shifting" of the corresponding equitable estate, the shifting use, was
permitted.
45 See 1 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 423, at 436-37 (footnotes omitted):
It would seem clear that, prior to the exercise of a general power, the object of the power
would have no more interest in the property than has the heir apparent in the property of his living
ancestor. Otherwise all persons in the world, since they are objects of an unexercised general
power, would have an interest in all property subject to such general powers. Thus, it has been
held that the object of an unexercised general power is not a necessary party to a proceeding to
determine the validity of the instrument creating the power. The trust in which the power is
created may be terminated without the consent of its objects. The object does not have a
contingent future interest within the meaning of a statute permitting the sale of lands affected with
a future interest. That his interest is not devisable or descendible is evidenced from the decisions
to the effect that the appointment lapses where the appointee dies before it is made.
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involved in the exercise of a general power, the difference between the ex-
ecutory interest and the expectancy, and the fact that an appointment changed
an expectancy into a property interest, were ignored in this historical formula-
tion of the doctrine of relation back.
Although evolution of the doctrine thus was not a particularly logical
development, it nevertheless became "the underlying dogma of the law of
powers of appointment. ',46 As variously stated, the doctrine established that
the act of exercise relates back to the creation of the power by the donor; the ap-
pointee takes from the donor, not the donee; the donee has no interest in
property by virtue of having a power to appoint it. Application of the doctrine
in the context of the general power 4 7 constitutes a denial that the authority to
name oneself or one's estate as the owner of certain property amounts to
anything more significant than an agency relationship with regard to the
property. Nevertheless, courts have applied relation back to general powers in
numerous situations, including the determination of the claims of electing
spouses, simply because relation back was the law.
48
Scholars in the area of future interests have long been critical of the doc-
trinal pretense that a general power is not a proprietary interest in property.
49
In the words of Professor Browder, "[o]ne who stands on the threshold of
ownership and needs only to lift his finger to enter is, but for a too precious
conceptual refinement, a proprietor in fact.' '50
The weakness in the assumptions underlying the agency approach to
general powers is also reflected in the growing number of situations where the
courts and legislatures refuse to apply relation back. "The current American
law of powers is the outgrowth of a fundamental acceptance of the 'relation
back' doctrine, with fairly frequent and important departures in situations
where the proprietary aspect of the power is most apparent." 51 The most visi-
ble areas of departure include the Rule Against Perpetuities, lapse, capacity of
the donee, creditors' rights, and the tax laws.
Relation back is not applied to general powers presently exercisable in
determining the validity of appointed interests under the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 52 The Rule limits the period during which the vesting of owner-
46 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 318(1), Comment b (1940).
47 With respect to special powers, the doctrine of relation back is not an inappropriate analysis of the
manner in which title passes to the appointees at the time of the donee's exercise. The donee "is in a
fiduciary position with reference to the power." Id. § 326, Comment a. The objects of a special power are a
limited group of persons, so that the discretion involved in the act of exercise is not as great as in the case of
many general powers. And, of course, the donee of a special power cannot derive personal benefit from its
exercise. The absence of proprietary interest in the donee, the donee's limited discretion, and the fiduciary
nature of the relationship, all suggest that it is proper to conceptualize the transfer of property subject to a
special power as a devolution of title from the donor to the appointee through the conduit of the donee-
agent.
48 See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.2; 3 R. POWELL & P. ROMAN, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 5 387 (1979); 2 L. SiMFS & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5§ 916-919.
49 See Berger, supra note 41; Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1255, 1270-73 (1960);
McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1106-15
(1942); Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property, 22 ILL. L. REv. 480, 486-93 (1928); Simes, Fifty
Years of Future Interests, 50 HARV. L. REv. 749, 772 (1937).
50 Browder, supra note 49, at 1270-71.
51 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note to Chapter 25 (Supp. 1948).
52 E.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 24.24; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 392 (1940);
3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5 1274.
The donee of a general testamentary power is subject to a significant restriction on the right to affect ti-
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ship interests in property may be delayed. Since the donee's power to affect ti-
tle is so broad and unrestrained, it is improper to view the appointed interests
as subject to any restraint measured from the time of the creation of the power.
Therefore, the period of the Rule is measured from the time of the appoint-
ment; and the exercise is treated as the creation of the appointee's interest in
the property.
Similarly, the agency theory of powers is abandoned in applying the law of
lapse to appointments under a testamentary power.53 The law of lapse imposes
a requirement of survivorship until the death of the testator upon the
beneficiaries under the testator's will. In the situation where property is ap-
pointed by the donee's will to one who survived the creation of the power, but
predeceased the donee, relation back would establish that the appointee takes
from the donor, and prevent a lapse. The courts, however, consistently find a
lapse of the appointed interest, 54 rejecting the doctrine in this context.
55
Antilapse statutes in most jurisdictions provide that when a lapse occurs,
and the deceased beneficiary leaves certain successors surviving the testator,
then the successors shall be substituted in the beneficiary's place and receive
the legacy. Relation back would prevent any application of such statutes to ap-
pointed interests, since the doctrine provides that the donor, not the donee, is
the appointee's testator. Nevertheless, the statutes generally are applied to in-
terests appointed under general powers, and the donee treated as owner of the
property for this purpose.
56
The doctrine of relation back establishes that the exercise of a general
power is not a legal act; legal capacity is not required in order to exercise such a
power. Thus, married women, under an incapacity to convey property at com-
mon law, were nevertheless able to appoint the same property. On the other
hand, the incapacity of the donee to convey owned property for reasons of in-
fancy or mental incompetence may prevent that person's valid exercise of a
power.5 7 "On questions of capacity of the donee, the courts have taken a posi-
tion which is practical rather than logically consistent,'"58 and have rejected
relation back when expedient.
In the area of creditors' rights, both the courts and the legislatures in
many jurisdictions have been involved in the process of eroding the doctrine of
tle to the property, imposed by the creating instrument, in that exercise cannot take place until the donee's
death. The weight of authority therefore favors the application of relation back in determining the validity
under the Rule Against Perpetuities of interests appointed under a general power that is testamentary only.
E.g., 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 1275.
53 E.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.46; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 349 (1940);
2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 917.
54 Cases so holding are collected at 2 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5 917, at 386 n.56.
55 The rule is the same whether the power is general or special, which suggests that the reason for
disregarding the doctrine of relation back in this context is not the proprietary nature of general powers.
Professors Simes and Smith suggest that the presumed intent of the donor supplies the rationale behind this
exception to the doctrine. "[I]t seems reasonable to suppose that a donor who did not permit the donee to
make an effective appointment until the donee's death intended the donee to make an appointment only to
persons who survived him." 2 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 917, at 386. Contra, 5 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, 5 23.46, at 584.
56 E.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.47; 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5
984.
57 See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.42; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 345(2)
and Caveat following § 345 (1940); 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 919.
58 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, S 919, at 388.
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relation back. The claims of general creditors to appointive property, like those
of the surviving spouse, are based upon a relationship with the donee. If the
doctrine of relation back is applied, such claims made through one who is
regarded as having no proprietary interest must fail.
Most courts considering the rights of creditors make a crucial distinction
between exercised and unexercised powers. As a general rule, creditors cannot
reach property subject to an unexercised power, general or special. 59 When the
donee exercises a general power by will60 in favor of volunteers, the weight of
authority is that creditors of the donee can reach the property to the extent that
the donee's owned assets are insufficient to satisfy the claims against the
estate.61 It is difficult to justify the exercised-unexercised distinction, except as
a compromise result reached by courts, desirous of providing relief to creditors,
in the face of a rule of law (relation back) stating that such relief must be
disallowed.62
Legislation in the area generally has expanded the rights of creditors, and
contracted the scope of the doctrine of relation back. 63 State statutes in the area
selectively disregard relation back, and at times go beyond the case law in
eroding the doctrine, by allowing claims against unexercised powers under cer-
tain circumstances. 64
Historically, the taxing authorities have been treated differently from
other creditors in determining whether a donee "owns" appointive property
for purposes of allowing creditor claims. Courts considering the issue under
both the federal estate tax and state inheritance and estate tax statutes, in the
absence of specific statutory treatment of powers, have applied the doctrine of
relation back strictly, with the result that the passage of the property at the
death of the donee is deemed a nontaxable event.
65
The impact of legislation in this area generally has been to establish yet
another exception to the doctrine of relation back. Section 2041 of the Internal
Revenue Code now provides for the inclusion in the gross estate of the donee of
property subject to certain "general" powers66 at the donee's death. Similarly,
59 E.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, 5 23.17; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY S 327 (1940);
2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, S 944.
In two situations creditors of the donee can reach the property subject to a power, whether or not it is
exercised: 1) If the creation of the power by the donor-donee is fraudulent as to creditors, it may be set aside.
2) If the donee is also the donor, and other incidents of ownership were retained when the power was
created, the property may be reachable, but only if donee's other assets are insufficient. Id. In neither of
these situations, however, is the property reachable by virtue of the donee's power of appointment. Rather,
in the first case the assets are reachable because the creditors have been defrauded; in the second because the
donee has retained the equivalent of ownership. With regard to exercised powers, on the other hand, the
assets are reachable because of the power of appointment.
60 There are no American cases deciding creditors' rights when a general power is exercised inter vivos.
See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 330 (1940).
61 E.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 23.16; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 329 (1940);
2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5 945.
62 See 2 L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5 945, at 401-03.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, 5 23.17; 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supranote
48, 5 390; 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, 5 1082.
65 See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, §5 23.23-.24; 3 R. POWELL & P. ROMAN, supra
note 48, § 392; 2 L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra note 19, § 948.
66 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) includes in the definition of general powers not only powers exercisable in favor
of the donee or the donee's estate, as in the Restatement of Property definition, supra note 16, but also those
powers exercisable in favor of the creditors of the donee or the donee's estate. Generally, unexercised powers
are taxable only if created after October 21, 1942. I.R.C. 5 2041(a).
[Vol. 55:99]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
most of the state legislation 67 dealing with the taxation of appointive property
at the death of the donee has had the effect of changing the common law rule of
no taxation.
68
Numerous exceptions have thus been carved out of the doctrine of relation
back in situations where there is a perceived policy reason for recognizing the
proprietary nature of general powers. Interest in maintaining the public fisc, in
protecting creditors' rights, and in limiting dead-hand control over property to
a period deemed by the law to be reasonable, have resulted in erosion of the
doctrine in the areas of estate and inheritance taxation, creditors' rights, and
the Rule Against Perpetuities, respectively. When it is recalled that relation
back was a matter of convenience rather than logic in the evolution of the law of
powers, and that the doctrine is an inaccurate definition of the relationships
and dynamics involved in the exercise of a general power, then it seems likely
that future developments in the law will continue to erode the doctrine. As
analyzed by Professor Powell:
[T]he conflict between the agency approach ... and the demand of modern
reality that the law recognize the donee of a power as having a property in-
terest in the appointive assets, whenever the finding of such an interest leads to
the presently desirable result ... marks an important potential growing point
in the law.
69
V. A Proposal That the Electing Spouse Be Allowed to
Reach Appointive Assets
In determining the rights of the electing spouse in the donee's appointive
property, there is a strong policy reason for waiving the application of the doc-
trine of relation back. The reason is the interest of the public in affording
economic protection to the spouse as expressed by the legislatures in enacting
the forced share statutes. The intent of the statutes is to provide protection by
allowing the spouse a share of the decedent's property at death. Relation back,
of course, disallows treatment of property subject to a general power at death as
property of the decedent, notwithstanding the fact that the decedent could by
one simple act have been in the same relationship with the appointive property
as with the owned assets, at the time of death. As discussed previously, 70 the
public concern for the spouse's economic welfare is sufficiently compelling
that, as embodied in the statutes, it outweighs another important social value,
freedom of testation. Surely an interest so compelling is in a class with the other
policies that have produced exceptions in the application of the doctrine of rela-
67 For a compilation of the statutes, see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, 5 23.24, at 525; id.
at 824 n.12 (Supp. 1977).
68 Professor Powell has noted that there are many variations in the scope of the statutes. "Some were
designed to catch exercises of powers which had been untaxed at their creation. Some were restricted to ex-
ercised powers, leaving a taking by default untaxed. Some were specifically restricted to the exercise of
general powers." 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 48, § 392, at 377 n.15.
69 Id. § 387, at 352.
70 See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
In other contexts the state interest in the financial protection of a person's dependents results in suspen-
sion of general legal principles. For example, while spendthrift trusts are sustained in many jurisdictions to
protect the equitable interest of the beneficiary from creditor claims, an exception is often made for the sup-
port claims of dependents. See, e.g., 2 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 5 157.1 (3d ed. 1967).
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tion back. An exception to the doctrine, resulting in recognition of the donee's
proprietary interest in this context, would be appropriate, realistic and consis-
tent with important public policy.
Assets subject to a general power at death should be includable in the
donee's estate, for purposes of determining the size of the elective share,
regardless of whether the donee exercised the power at death, whether the
creating instrument named a taker in default, whether the power was presently
exercisable or testamentary only, and whether the decedent had other interests
in the property.
The proposal to include appointive assets in the elective estate is based
upon the nature of the relationship between the decedent and the appointive
property. The core of this relationship is the decedent's power to name the
owner of the property, from among a group of objects including the decedent's
estate, at the time of death. It is thus irrelevant whether the donee actually ex-
ercised the power at death. It is the control over the property, not the use made
of it, that is proprietary. As discussed previously, 7 1 in the area of creditors'
rights, many courts have found the distinction between exercised and unexer-
cised powers to be crucial. Creditors are allowed to reach only those assets that
have been appointed in the donee's will. The irreconcilability between this
exercised-unexercised distinction, and a theory that general powers are like
ownership for this purpose, has been noted by Professor Simes:
Very likely courts of equity in allowing relief to creditors when the power was
exercised did so with a feeling that a general power was just as much a pro-
prietary interest as a number of other things a creditor could get at; and that
they would go as far as possible in enabling the creditor to recover. That the
statutes already referred to make no distinction between executed and unex-
ecuted powers is strong evidence that the tendency is to allow creditors to
reach both; and that only technical difficulties prevented equity from doing
both. The fact, however, remains that what equity has done in the interests of
the donee's creditors cannot be worked out satisfactorily on the theory that the
general power is an interest in property.
72
If the spouse's claim to appointive property is allowed, it is in derogation
of the interest of persons entitled to the property at the donee's death, ac-
cording to the law of powers. In the event of a proper exercise, that person is
the appointee. In the situation where the donee does not exercise the power at
death, assets would normally pass to the takers in default named by the donor,
if any; or to the successors in interest of the donor, if there are no default
takers.
Allowing claims against appointive property operates to defeat the express
intent of the donee to benefit appointees in the event of exercise, and the
presumed intent of the donee to benefit default takers in the event of non-
exercise. The element of defeating decedent's intent, however, is basic to
forced share legislation.
For some purposes, the interest of the taker in default is given greater pro-
71 See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
72 Simes, supra note 49, at 507 (footnotes omitted).
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tection than the interests of other distributees under a power. The added
safeguard probably arises out of consideration for the express intent of the
donor in creating such an interest.
73
The primary intent of the donor in every case is to create an authority in
the donee. To the extent that the general power is viewed as ownership, the
allowance of spousal claims is not inconsistent with the intent of the donor in
creating the donee's interest. Once a policy determination is made to include
appointive assets in the elective estate, then it should be irrelevant who would
have taken, but for the spouse's claim.
74
A general power should be reachable by the surviving spouse whether it
was presently exercisable or testamentary only. It is undeniable that during the
lifetime of the donee a presently exercisable power is a greater incident of
ownership with regard to the property than is the testamentary power. The
determination to include property in the elective estate, however, is based upon
the relationship existing between the donee and the property at the time of
death, the key to which is the donee's power to pass the property to the estate.
That relationship is the same regardless of whether the donee could have exer-
cised the power inter vivos.
75
Since the reason for including the appointive assets in the elective estate is
the perceived proprietary nature of the general power, it is likewise irrelevant
whether the donee held other incidents of ownership with regard to the proper-
ty.
VI. Property Appointed to the Surviving Spouse
In the situation where the donee exercises a general power by will in favor
of the electing spouse, the result under the analysis suggested in this article is
the same as in the situations where the appointment is made in favor of others
or no appointment is made. In every case, the appointive property is included
in the elective estate for purposes of determining the size of the spouse's share.
The cases involving a testamentary exercise in favor of the electing spouse have
been analyzed by the courts differently from those, discussed previously,
76
where the exercise was in favor of others.
In Fiske v. Fiske, 77 testator exercised a general testamentary power over cer-
tain real estate in favor of his executor and trustee. The will provided for the
payment of income from the property to his wife for life, and the distribution of
the principal to others after her death. The widow proceeded under the
Massachusetts election statute, which permitted a widow to waive "any provi-
sions the husband may have made for her in his will," and to claim instead
"such portion of his estate as she would have been entitled to if he had died in-
testate. "78 In holding that the spouse was entitled to no share of the real estate,
73 See Note, Remainders Over in Default of Exercise of Powers of Appointment and Revocation, 106 U. PA. L.
REv. 420 (1958).
74 See Berger, supra note 41, at 127. Contra, Browder, supra note 49, at 1272.
75 Berger, supra note 41, at 123; Browder, supra note 49, at 1272.
76 See text accompanying notes 20-39 supra.
77 173 Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 916 (1899).
78 Pub. Stat. ch. 127, § 18 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 15 (West 1969)), quoted
at 173 Mass. at 418, 53 N.E. at 918.
112 [October 1979]
ELECTIVE SHARE STATUTES
the court relied upon two statutory grounds. First, since the statute required
the widow to waive all provision made for her under the will, and the exercise
was testamentary, the appointment was void. The court reconciled this posi-
tion with the doctrine of relation back, stating, "[i]t is none the less [sic] a pro-
vision made for her in the will that it includes an appointment of property
which does not belong to the testator, and which, in theory of law, when the ap-
pointment takes effect, passes under the original instrument of conveyance.' ,79
The court focused also upon the language of the statute granting the electing
spouse a share of the estate as in intestacy. Since appointive assets do not
generally pass through the estate of an intestate donee, the court found that the
statutory language expressly excluded such property from the elective estate.
The court ordered the appointive property distributed to the takers in default
named in the donor's deed of trust. The surviving spouse was allowed a share
only in decedent's owned assets.80
In Huddy's Estate,8t another court considering the claim of an electing
spouse-appointee concluded that the spouse was entitled to keep the property
appointed to him under the decedent's general testamentary power, while tak-
ing a forced share of the owned assets. The court relied upon language in the
statute allowing the electing widower to take against his deceased wife's will a
share in her "real and personal estate" as if there were no will. According to
the court, the statute on its face dealt only with owned assets but "in no wise
affects the distribution of property ... disposed of in the exercise of a power of
appointment, for such property is not and never was the 'real and personal
estate' of the wife. ")
82
Both the Fiske court and the Huddy court accepted the doctrine of relation
back in reaching the divergent results in those cases. In each case the resolution
of the spouse's claim turned, not upon any consideration of the decedent's in-
terest in the appointive property, but rather, upon a construction of the elec-
tion statute, and its effect upon the provision in the will exercising the power.
79 173 Mass. at 418, 53 N.E. at 918.
In Chase Nat'l Bank v. Frazier, 243 App. Div. 623, 276 N.Y.S. 524 (1935), the court cited the Fiske
case in support of its holding that the electing spouse-appointee lost all interest in the appointive estate
because her "rejection applied to every provision of the will that was beneficial to her, whether those provi-
sions related to property the title to which vested in her husband, or merely to property over which he had
the power of appointment." 243 App. Div. 623, 276 N.Y.S. at 526.
80 In Kates's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 A. 97 (1925), the court undertook a similar statutory analysis in
ruling against the spouse's claim to a forced share of property appointed in part to others by the decedent's
will.
An alternative construction of the statutory language providing for an elective share of the estate as in
intestacy is that the language does not limit the elective estate to property that would have passed by in-
testacy if decedent had died without a will, but rather is intended to indicate the share of the elective estate to
which the spouse is intifled. See In re Estate of Ellis, 30 Misc. 2d 225, 139 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1954), discussed at
note 92 infra. Other aspects of Kates's Estate are discussed at the text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
81 236 Pa. 276, 84 A. 909 (1912).
82 Id. at 282, 84 A. at 911 (construing Act of May 4, 1855, Pub. L. No. 430, S 1).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed its holding in Huddy's Estate in Shoch's Estate, 271 Pa.
158, 114 A. 502 (1921), a case dealing with the effect of a statute, revoking the will of a decedent by opera-
tion of law in the event of a change in family circumstances, upon the testamentary exercise of a power. The
court stated that the election statute in Huddy's Estate "in terms, confines its operation to the individual
estate of the testator, and we said that the taking against the will is not viewed in law as necessarily rendering
the decedent intestate." 271 Pa. at 164, 114 A. at 504.
The rule established in Huddy's Estate was subsequently changed in Pennsylvania by statute. Wills Act,
Pub. L. No. 89, 5 8(c) (1947) (current version at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5 2202-2203 (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980)) (construed in Austin Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 79 (1965)).
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The Fiske court concluded that the statute voided the exercise, so the spouse lost
the appointive assets. The Huddy court construed the statute as not affecting the
exercise, and so the spouse received the entire appointive estate. 83
Under the analysis suggested by this article, that a general power should
be treated like ownership for purposes of determining the rights of the electing
spouse, the spouse-appointee would be required to relinquish claims through
the will in appointive assets, as in the other assets of the decedent. The appoin-
tive assets would be included in the elective estate from which the spouse's
share is determined, whether or not the spouse was the named appointee.
VII. Distribution of the Appointive Assets
Assets subject to a general power at death should be included in the elec-
tive estate in every case for purposes of determining the size of the elective
share. The actual distribution of the property will depend upon the method
employed in the jurisdiction for determining what assets are to be used to
satisfy the forced share.
Consider first the situation where the property has been appointed to
others than the spouse. In a jurisdiction where the statutory share is satisfied
proportionately from all of the decedent's property, 84 a pro rata share of the ap-
pointive property (along with a similar share of the owned assets) will pass to
the spouse. The remainder will pass to decedent's appointees. If the statute
provides that the property given by will to the spouse is to be first used to satisfy
the forced share, 85 and other property was bequeathed to the spouse, then the
appointive assets will be reached (along with other assets not bequeathed to the
spouse) only to the extent necessary to satisfy the difference between the
amount of the claim and the amount bequeathed to the spouse. The remainder
of appointive property will pass to the named appointees.
When the property is appointed to the electing spouse, under a statute
providing for satisfaction of the forced share first from property designated by
the decedent for distribution to the spouse, the appointive assets will be so
used. In a jurisdiction providing for pro rata satisfaction out of all assets, the
result will be distribution of only a pro rata share of the appointive property to
the spouse-appointee. As to the rest of the appointive assets, the attempted ex-
ercise will be ineffective; the property will pass to the takers in default.
VIII. Implementing the Proposal Under Existing Statutes
The thesis of this article is that, based upon the nature of the general
83 A discussion of some policy reasons for and against allowing the spouse to retain the appointive assets
while electing against the will, appears in Phelps, The Widow's Right of Election in the Estate of Her Husband, 37
MICH. L. REv. 401, 410-20 (1939). The author, like the courts that have considered the issue, does not
entertain the possibility of including the property in the elective estate.
84 E.g., MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-208(b) (1974), provides: "If there is an election to take an
intestate share, contribution to the payment of it shall be prorated among all legatees."
85 E.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-207(a) (section amended 1975) provides:
In the proceeding for an elective share, values included in the augmented estate which pass or have
passed to the surviving spouse, or which would have passed to the spouse but were renounced, are
applied first to satisfy the elective share and to reduce any contributions due from other recipients
of transfers included in the augmented estate.
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power of appointment and the policy concerns reflected in elective share
legislation, the electing spouse should be able to reach appointive assets of the
decedent. Could a court, concurring with this conclusion, accomplish the
desired result under the terms of existing statutes? Most of the elective share
statutes provide for a share of the decedent's "estate" or "property." In the
absence of any effort on the part of the legislature to define this elective estate,
there is no apparent reason why courts cannot define the term to include ap-
pointive property.
In Pennsylvania, the elective share statute expressly provides that proper-
ty passing at decedent's death, by the decedent's exercise or nonexercise of a
power created by someone other than the decedent, is not includable in the
elective estate. 86 The statutes of Florida 7 and Wisconsin"8 define the elective
estate to be property of the decedent subject to administration. Appointive
property is not subject to administration as part of the decedent's probate
estate, unless appointed to the estate. Although no express reference is made by
these statutes to powers, appointive property is probably excluded from the
reach of the suviving spouse by implication. Absent such a reference to probate
property on the face of the statute, however, there is no need to equate the elec-
tive estate with the probate estate. 89 In the face of nonprobate interests that are
fairly treated as property of the decedent at death, the courts have rejected such
a narrow construction of the word "estate" in the election statutes in other
contexts.90
Some elective share statutes refer to the state intestacy statute, 91 providing
for a share of the estate to the electing spouse, "as in intestacy." The reference
to the intestacy statute need not be construed as limiting the elective estate to
property that would have passed by intestacy had the decedent died without a
will. Such a construction would exclude appointive assets from the elective
estate. The reference to the intestacy statute can more properly be viewed as an
indication of the portion of the estate to which the spouse is entitled.
92
There is some statutory authority for allowing the spouse to reach appoin-
tive assets. A statute in Michigan provides that property subject to a general
86 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5§ 2202-2203 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.201 (West 1976).
88 Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 861.05 (West 1971 and Supp. 1979-1980).
89 It has been recognized that the distinction between decedent estate property in the strict sense and
joint bank accounts, Totten trusts, life insurance, transfers with retained powers, andgeneralpowers
of appointment, is an artificial one for the purpose of estate taxation; the same principle is applicable
to family protection.
Haskell, supra note 8, at 522 (emphasis added).
The Uniform Probate Code provides for "an elective share of one-third of the augmented estate."
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201. The comments following section 2-202 use the term "probate estate" in-
terchangeably with "estate" in describing the property of the decedent to which other assets must be added
in order to produce the augmented estate. The editorial language thus conveys an intent that the basic
"estate" not include nonprobate assets. Under the Code scheme, not all assets subject to a general power at
death are required to be added to the basic estate in arriving at the augmented estate. Id.
90 In the illusory transfer cases, the courts have included nonprobate assets in the elective estate. See text
accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
91 E.g., KAN. STAT. 5 59-603 (1976).
92 See In re Estate of Ellis, 30 Misc. 2d 225, 139 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1954), where the court held that the New
York election statute allowing for an elective share as in intestacy gave the spouse a claim against real estate
located in another jurisdiction that would not have passed under the New York intestacy statute in the event
of death without a will. The court stated that the reference to the intestacy statute "was merely designed to
fix the distributive share of the surviving spouse, depending upon whether the decedent was or was not sur-
vived by children." Id. at 227, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 643. But see text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
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power, that the decedent exercised or manifested an intent to exercise by will,
is regarded as part of the decedent's estate for, inter alia, the purpose of deter-
mining the elective share. 93 The forced share statutes of Delaware94 and
Maryland9 define elective estate by reference to the federal estate tax defini-
tion of gross estate. Section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code includes in the
gross estate many general powers created in the decedent by another.
Absent such express statutory authority, the courts in all but a few
jurisdictions could accomplish the result of allowing spousal claims against ap-
pointive assets under the general provisions of the elective share statutes. The
judicial task would, of course, be facilitated by legislation expressly providing
that property subject to any general power at the time of death is considered to
be part of the elective estate.
IX. Conclusion
There is a trend in the American law of general powers of appointment
away from the rigid, unquestioning application of the doctrine of relation back.
In a number of contexts, for reasons of public policy, the courts and legislatures
have carved exceptions to the doctrine and recognized the proprietary nature of
the general power. The state interest expressed in elective share legislation is
the concern for provision of economic security to the surviving spouse in com-
mon law property jurisdictions. In recognition of this state interest, it would be
appropriate to suspend the agency theory of powers in determining the right of
the electing spouse to a forced share of decedent's appointive assets.
93 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 556.116 (Supp. 1979-1980).
94 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (Supp. 1978).
95 MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. S 3-203 (1978).
[October 19791
